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Abstract The impact of a water demand management plan on a water system and its users is investigated 
within a comprehensive cooperative water allocation framework. In particular, a demand management plan is 
incorporated into a two-step multi-period fair water allocation model. A modified cooperative game is 
designed for the sharing of additional net benefits under the scenario having water demand management. The 
results indicate that cooperation among water users can yield more net benefits, and a water demand 
management plan is able to lead to a further increase of the aggregated net benefits by means of water transfers 
from less productive users to more productive ones. By utilizing the modified cooperative game, fair sharing 
of additional net benefits ensures that every water user can expect to receive more net benefits and thereby 
water users are motivated by incentives to implement a water demand management plan which in turn 
improves water use efficiency. The results demonstrate that the demand management plan can be of great 
assistance in some arid and semi-arid regions.  
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1 Introduction  
Challenged by the growing demand for water and limited supply of water, the question of how to allocate water 
resources among competing demand uses during shortage periods has become a critical issue and has attracted 
much attention from water managers and researchers globally (Speed et al. 2013). Numerous water conflicts 
have been caused by the imbalance between water supply and demand (Gleick and Heberger 2014). Various 
practical efforts have been made by water managers such as the expanding of construction of water 
infrastructures over the past century in order to increase water supply. These efforts have effectively alleviated 
water stresses facing humanity, and have provided massive benefits in terms of greater economic returns and 
fewer water-related disasters. However, the construction of infrastructures often brings unanticipated adverse 
effects such as migration relocation, reduced runoff, and species extinction (Gleick 2003a). Along with the 
dramatically growing water demand, increasing supply to meet the future demand is no longer a cost-effective 
way towards a sustainable future; more proactive water management techniques are required.  
Water resources allocation problems are essentially concerned with how to distribute limited water resources 
among competing activities to achieve maximum social welfare. As a result, optimization methods are 
frequently utilized in terms of modelling techniques to find an optimal water allocation scheme. Many 
optimization techniques have been proposed, including linear programming (Takama et al. 1981; Jacobs and 
Vogel 1998; Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldmann 2010), non-linear programming (Cai et al. 2003; Kilic and 
Anac 2010; Yang et al. 2011), dynamic programming (Alaya et al. 2003; Luo et al. 2007), genetic algorithms 
(Ahmed and Sarma 2005; Nicklow et al. 2010), and any combination of these techniques (Cai et al. 2001; 
Huang et al. 2002; Li et al. 2009). 
One of the deficiencies of optimization techniques is that they assume every stakeholder is acting voluntarily 
to achieve optimal system-wide performance. However, the optimal system-wide outcome does not necessarily 
mean the best outcome for every individual stakeholder. It is important to provide motivation to every 
stakeholder, such as obtaining greater (or, at least, not any less) economic benefits, in order to achieve the best 
system performance. 
Because water allocation is a problem involving multiple stakeholders, in which each stakeholder has 
different interests, conflicts usually arise in water allocation. Accordingly, game theory is a powerful tool that 
can be utilized to investigate the behavior of stakeholders in water management problems, and many studies 
have been done in this domain (Madani 2010; Madani and Hipel 2011). Cooperative game theory, as a major 
branch of game theory, studies how the gains of cooperation can be shared within a coalition, thus making it a 
powerful technique in the water allocation domain. Cooperative game theory has been successfully applied to 
many areas within water management such as cost allocation of water projects (Young et al. 1982; Sechi et al. 
2013) and waste load allocation (Kilgour et al. 1988; Okada and Mikami 1992), but possesses limited 
application to water allocation. To fill in the gap, a comprehensive water allocation framework based on 
cooperative game theory was proposed (Wang et al. 2003, 2008). In this structure, water allocation is carried 
out in two steps: initial allocation based on existing water rights systems or agreements, and cooperative 
reallocation involving water transfer and benefits sharing among water users. More details about the framework 
are discussed in Section 3. 
Since the initial allocation is calculated according to several principles of fairness and the reallocation is 
obtained by solution concepts from cooperative game theory such as the core and Shapley value, the framework 
solves water allocation problems in a fair way. In fact, it can provide a reasonable solution during periods of 
water shortage. However, as mentioned above, the future demand cannot be satisfied if the demand continues 
its exponential growth. Fair water allocation alone is not sufficient for future scenarios; accordingly, the focus 
of water management needs to shift to demand side management, and water users should be encouraged to use 
water more efficiently and productively. In this paper, a water demand management plan is incorporated into 
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the cooperative water allocation framework, and its associated impacts are assessed. This research constitutes 
a significant expansion of previous work published by the authors in a conference paper (Xiao et al. 2015). The 
novelty of this paper is the incorporation of the idea of water demand management into a water allocation 
procedure, and the fair sharing of additional net benefits among users through cooperative game theoretic 
approaches. Water users are motivated by incentives to implement water demand management which in turn 
improves water use efficiency, thereby moving formal decision making towards sustainable water resources 
development.  
2 Water Demand Management 
The demand for water is expected to grow sharply in the near future due to the burgeoning global population, 
economic development, and an increasing awareness of environmental conservation, while the availability of 
water supply will remain constant or even be reduced because of climate change impacts and water pollution. 
During the past few decades, water management has witnessed a gradual shift from water supply management 
towards water demand management. It should be noted that water demand management should be considered 
as an important complement rather than a replacement to water supply management, because new water supply 
infrastructures will continue to be constructed, and there are ongoing research on desalination and recycling 
wastewater as new sources of water supply (Sahin et al. 2015; Ziolkowska 2015). Moreover, water users are 
encouraged to improve their water use efficiency, but how to motivate users to use water more efficiently is 
still one of the biggest challenges facing water policy makers and managers.  
Focusing on influencing water consumption by water users and promoting water use efficiency, water 
demand management is widely considered as a promising path towards the sustainable development of water 
resources. Measures that can be taken include water-saving technologies, economic instruments, educational 
programs, and administrative measures (Kindler 2010). This approach can be of great assistance in arid and 
semi-arid areas and extreme conditions such as droughts, and it will continue to play an increasingly important 
role in water management in the future.  
 Successful applications of water demand management have been reported in some nations (Tate 1989; 
Kampragou et al. 2011; Tortajada and Joshi 2013), and many studies have been carried out on the issue 
(Savenije and van der Zaag 2002; Brooks 2006; Araral and Wang 2013). However, most studies and 
applications focus on urban water demand and are based on economic instruments such as water pricing and 
water tariffs, whereas there are few studies at the basin level. A basin is a unit that is widely used in water 
allocation problems. Therefore, it is important and interesting to investigate the impacts of water demand 
management at the basin level. 
Water has traditionally been viewed as an indispensable resource for activities like agricultural production, 
economic development, and ecosystem maintenance. These activities compete for limited water resources. 
However, the real purpose of water use is to produce products and services to satisfy people’s needs. As 
explained by Gleick et al. (2011), “people want to satisfy demands for goods and services, such as food, fiber, 
waste disposal, they may not care how much water is used – or even whether water is used at all – as long as 
these goods and services are produced in convenient, cost-effective, and socially acceptable ways”. A particular 
example is that about 100 to 200 tons of water was needed to produce a ton of steel in the 1920s, while less 
than four tons of water is required for each ton of steel produced nowadays (Gleick 2003b).  
The basic idea of a water demand management plan is that every water user has the potential to improve its 
water use efficiency, such that certain tasks can be carried out with less water. For instance, less water is needed 
to irrigate a farm with a drip system or sprinkler technology compared to flood irrigation. Since water use can 
be reduced while the same level of outputs be maintained, the water demand of each user or user group can be 
adjusted by a different factor according to its capacities for adjustment, as well as the socioeconomic 
consequences arising from the changes.  
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An example of a water demand management plan is reducing the demand of water for agricultural and 
industrial uses by 25% and 10%, respectively, while maintaining the water demand for hydropower, 
environmental, and domestic uses at the original levels. It is reported that almost 70% of the extracted 
freshwater is used for irrigation purposes globally (FAO 2013), and the number can be as high as 80% in some 
regions such as California (Christian-Smith et al. 2012). Irrigation is generally considered as the largest water 
consumer in a basin. Moreover, irrigation often has the highest priority in regions having a prior rights system 
based on the doctrine of "first in time, first in rights", because farmers normally appeared before other water 
consumers did. Meanwhile, irrigation water use efficiency is generally low, especially when a flood irrigation 
method is still widely utilized. The conserved water from agricultural uses can be reallocated to meeting urban 
demands or environmental purposes. A case study in California indicated that 13% of agricultural water 
consumption is able to be conserved for reallocation to other uses even if its irrigation water use efficiency is 
already above 73% (Christian-Smith et al. 2012). One can assume that more water can be conserved in 
agriculture in regions having low water use efficiency. 
In this paper, a water demand management plan is incorporated into a cooperative water allocation model 
to investigate its impact on water users. Various levels of reduction will be assessed. One of the advantages of 
this plan is that the performance of the system is expected to be better in terms of greater economic benefits for 
every water user; thus, it can provide positive incentives for water users to implement a demand management 
plan. The main reasons are: (1) water use efficiency improvement, (2) water transfer from low productive users 
to high productive users, and (3) cooperation among water users.   
It should be noted that the means of achieving these levels of reduction of water use is beyond the scope of 
this paper, because there are numerous ways to improve water use efficiency and each way has a different 
impact on the decrease in water use. Furthermore, the cost of adopting different measures can be diverse. For 
example, the impact and the cost of adopting new drip irrigation technology and that of adopting an advanced 
irrigation schedule may be quite different. Moreover, the impact and the cost of a particular measure may vary 
from basin to basin. 
3 Cooperative Water Allocation with Water Demand Management 
Conflicts among water users always exist in water resources allocation because each water user has its own 
interests, and these interests normally conflict with one another. Optimization approaches alone may not be 
able to provide an adequate solution to the conflict. The combination of optimization techniques and game 
theory could provide a proper path for better conflict resolution in assisting water policy makers and water 
managers. In this section, a comprehensive water allocation framework at the basin level called the Cooperative 
Water Allocation Model (CWAM), proposed by Wang et al. (2008), will be described and then the water 
demand management plan will be incorporated into the CWAM. 
The objective of the CWAM is to allocate limited water resources in an equitable, efficient, and 
environmentally sustainable manner. It involves two main steps: initial water allocation using priority-based or 
lexicographic techniques, and fair reallocation of net benefits (represented in monetary terms) using 
cooperative game theoretic approaches.  
Initial water rights allocation is carried out in a basin based on its existing water rights systems or 
agreements. Optimization techniques are essentially utilized for initial water allocation. Based on the existing 
water rights systems, three multi-objective optimization methods, called the priority-based maximal multi-
period network flow (PMMNF) approach, the modified riparian water rights allocation (MRWRA) method, 
and the lexicographic minimax water shortage ratios (LMWSR) approach, have been designed for initial 
allocation. PMMNF is a very versatile method in which water users’ priority ranks are the main principle for 
allocating water resources. In this situation, some “junior” users with low priorities may not be able to receive 
any water during water shortage periods. PMMNF is applicable under the prior, riparian, and public water 
5 
 
rights systems, while MRWRA is a special form of PMMNF under the riparian rights system. LMWSR is 
designed for sharing water shortages among all users, and is applicable under the public rights system. 
Sequential and iterative solution algorithms to solve the three types of problems have been developed (Wang 
et al. 2007), and solvers in GAMS (GAMS, 2005) can be utilized to optimize these programs. 
 Once the initial water rights are obtained, they are considered as inputs to the Hydrologic-Economic River 
Basin Model (HERBM), along with other inputs such as water demand and benefit functions of all types of 
uses, the set of stakeholders, coalitions and ownership. The purpose of the model is to estimate the net benefits 
of various coalitions and search for the water allocation schemes with the maximum net benefits in a basin. 







  (1) 
where NBjt represents the net benefits for demand site j during period t ($106); λ denotes the decision variables 
consisting of water quantity and water quality; and Ω is the feasible solution space subject to hydrologic and 
economic constraints. The net benefits function for agricultural (AGR) use is represented by a quadratic 
function form, while the net benefits function for municipal and industrial (MI) use can be derived from a water 
price-demand function with constant price-elasticity and choke price. 
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where  
Q(j, t) is the total inflow to demand site j during period t (106 m3),  
CpN(j, t) is the concentration of pollutant p in the total inflow to demand site j during period t, 
wc(j, t) is the water supply cost ($/m3), 
b0 to b5p are coefficients derived from a sub-model, namely the Irrigation Water Planning Model (IWPM). 
The price-demand function with constant price-elasticity and choke price for MI use is shown as: 
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P(j, t) is the price of willingness to pay to retrieve water ($/m3), 
P0(j, t) is the choke price ($/m3), 
Q0(j, t) is the choke quantity (106 m3), 
α(j, t) and β(j, t) are parameters for the water price-demand function (α(j, t)>0, β(j, t)<0).   
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     When the net benefits for different coalitions are obtained, they serve as the input of the Cooperative 
Reallocation Game (CRG). In a cooperative game, let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of stakeholders, and a group 
of stakeholders working cooperatively is called a coalition and is denoted by S. Each individual stakeholder 
can be considered as a coalition which contains the individual stakeholder only, while the coalition that contains 
all stakeholders is called the grand coalition.  
     The reallocation of net benefits is viewed as a cooperative game (N, v), in which N is the set of stakeholders 
and v is the characteristic function on N. The notation v(S) represents the maximum aggregated benefits 
produced by the members of coalition S through internal cooperation, and is calculated by:    
( ) : ,  jt
j t
v S max NB j S 
 
=   
 
  (5) 
Accordingly, the benefits of individual stakeholders and the grand coalition can be expressed as v({1}), v({2}), 
…, v({n}), and v(N), respectively.  
The benefits gained by stakeholders after the reallocation are denoted by a vector x = (x1, x2, …, xn ). The 
vector is called an imputation or a solution to a cooperative game. The term xi - v({i}) represents the additional 
benefits that can be gained from participating in a coalition (also called participation value) for stakeholder i. 
The imputation must satisfy the conditions of individual rationality, group rationality, and joint efficiency 
(Young et al. 1982; Tisdell and Harrison 1992): 
Individual rationality:  
( )     {  }ix v i i N    (6) 
Group rationality:  
( )      2i
i S
x v S S

   (7) 





  (8) 
Various solution concepts such as core-based (nucleolus and its variations) (Young et al. 1982; Lejano and 
Davos 1995; Owen 1995) and non-core-based (Shapley value) (Shapley 1953) concepts are utilized for solving 
the cooperative game in the CWAM (Wang et al. 2003). Since the computational complexity of solving a 
cooperative game can be exponentially high with an increase of stakeholder numbers, simplification is 
necessary to reduce the computational load to a reasonable level; thus, it is useful to classify some individual 
stakeholders into stakeholder groups based on their types (Wang et al. 2008).  
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The water allocation schemes and benefits sharing solutions generated by these solution concepts can be 
used to facilitate better water allocation decision-making. However, the framework does not provide a 
mechanism to encourage water users to improve their water use efficiency and conserve water resources. Facing 
the expanding gap between water supply and demand, more efforts on the demand side need to be made. 
Therefore, a demand management plan is incorporated into the CWAM.  
When a demand management plan is implemented, it may have different impacts on different users. For 
example, the user who reduces its water use may gain less benefits from the utilization of water, while the user 
who receives more water may produce greater benefits. As a matter of course, the aggregated benefits of the 
coalitions may also change accordingly. The economic impact on a water reduced user might also be positive 
because of the efficiency improvement. The aggregated benefits of coalitions with a water demand management 
plan may be represented as ṽ({1}), ṽ({2}), …, ṽ({n}), ṽ(S), and ṽ(N). Then, a new cooperative game (N, ṽ) is 
formed.  
All three conditions of individual and group rationality and joint efficiency must still be satisfied for solving 
the new cooperative game. Moreover, it is necessary to ensure that no coalition will receive less benefits than 
the benefits gained from cooperative reallocation without a demand management plan; otherwise, some users 
may not have incentives to implement the water demand management plan. Therefore, the conditions of 
individual and group rationality should remain the same as equations (6) and (7), while the condition of joint 
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The core-based and non-core-based solution concepts are applied to the modified cooperative game, and 
new results can be obtained and be assessed. The structure of the Cooperative Water Allocation Model with a 
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Fig. 1 Structure of the Cooperative Water Allocation Model (CWAM) with a water demand management plan  
(based on Hipel et al. (2013)) 
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4 Case Study 
In this section, an illustrative case is used to evaluate the impact of a water demand management plan on the 
economic benefits for water users. In a basin, there are typically various types of water uses, such as agricultural 
production, urban development, and environmental conservation, which must share the available water 
resources. Additionally, reservoirs are an essential part of water management operations. Without loss of 
generality, a hypothetical network, as depicted in Fig. 2, is designed. The network has 2 inflow (In1, In2), 1 
outlet (O1), 2 reservoir (R1, R2), 2 agricultural (A1, A2), 2 domestic (D1, D2), 2 general (G1, G2), 2 industrial 
(I1, I2), and 2 instream flow requirement (S1, S2) demand nodes. The general demand refers to municipal, 
excluding domestic, demand, such as water use in commercial establishments and public infrastructures. The 
instream flow requirement indicates the minimum instream flow needed for the sake of the safety of aquatic 
ecology and recreational purposes. 
The water allocation problem is designed for a period of 12 months. The monthly supply and demand data 
are adapted from the South Saskatchewan River Basin (SSRB) case in a drought year in Wang et al. (2008). 
The monthly water supply consists of inflow, reservoir storage, and local adjustments from small tributaries. It 
should be noted that local adjustments only occurred at reservoir, junction, instream flow requirement, and 
outlet nodes. The initial reservoir storages are set to 163.29 million m3 and 317.06 million m3 for R1 and R2, 
respectively.  
In this case, it is assumed that agricultural users’ demand will be reduced by different percentages, such as 
0% (baseline), 5%, and 10%, while other users maintain their original water demand. Once all the users are 
satisfied, then no user is willing to participate in a coalition; therefore, there will be no need to reduce 
agricultural users’ demand further. It should also be noted that the results in this section are based on the original 
net benefit functions. For the case of net benefit functions with improved water use efficiency, the results will 



















Fig. 2 The network of the illustrative case study 
An uptrend can be observed for total net benefits from both initial water allocation and optimal reallocation 
as the level of reduction increases, as depicted in Fig. 3(a). More specifically, when the PMMNF method is 
utilized for initial allocation, about 1,004 million dollars can be produced from initial allocation without any 
reduction, and it is increased to about 1,191 million dollars from optimal reallocation, which means an extra 
9 
 
187 million dollars can be produced through a grand cooperation. Along with the increased level of reduction, 
more net benefits can be generated, and it reaches up to about 1,284 million dollars when the level of reduction 
goes up to 30%. The increase demonstrates that not only is cooperation among water users more beneficial, but 
the demand management plan also is. Moreover, this increase gives incentives for water users to implement 
the demand management plan, as long as the additional net benefits are shared fairly among users so that 
everyone can receive more benefits. 
It is also observed that the gaps between the total net benefits from initial allocation and from optimal 
reallocation become smaller along with the increased level of reduction. The main reason for this is the 
conserved water from agricultural users is distributed to city users located downstream during the initial 
allocation. Since city users have a higher productivity than agricultural users do, as is normally the case, the 
overall benefits from initial allocation for the entire basin is growing rapidly, while the growth of total net 
benefits from optimal reallocation is more moderate. When the level of reduction reaches a certain percentage, 
all agricultural, domestic, general, and industrial users are fully satisfied; thus, there is no need for reallocation. 
This result demonstrates that water transfer from low productive users to high productive users can generate 
more beneficial outcomes. 
A similar uptrend can be observed for total net benefits from initial allocation and from optimal reallocation 
when the LMWSR method is utilized for initial allocation, as depicted in Fig. 3(b). However, the increase is 
not as obvious as that from the PMMNF method. This is because the LMWSR method generates more evenly-
spread water shortage ratios so that water is allocated in a more economically efficient manner.  
The fact that cooperation is more beneficial is easy to understand. The key problems are how to fairly allocate 
the total net benefits among users, and how to evaluate the contribution of water users in implementing a 
demand management plan. For instance, the total net benefits without the plan are about 1,191 million dollars 
when the PMMNF method is utilized, as shown in Fig. 3(a), and this is the total net benefits of the grand 
coalition. Similarly, the total net benefits of the grand coalition reach about 1,243 million dollars with a 20% 
reduction. Therefore, the question is how to share the 1,243 million dollars among stakeholders such that every 
stakeholder will get no less benefits than it can get without a 20% reduction. 
It is important that no stakeholder will receive less net benefits with a plan than the net benefits it can get 
without a plan. A summary of the net benefits gained from the modified cooperative game for stakeholders 
with different levels of reduction under different cooperative solution concepts is depicted in Fig. 4. The bar 
charts represent the total net benefits of irrigators (A1, A2), and line charts denote the total net benefits of city 
users (City 1, City 2). It can be seen that, compared to the baseline results, all stakeholders will receive more 
net benefits under the cases with water reduction. The more percentage of reduction, the more net benefits can 
be shared. It seems that under solution concepts such as nucleolus and weak nucleolus, more additional net 
benefits are shared by irrigators than by city users; while under proportional nucleolus and normalized 
nucleolus concepts, city users share more additional net benefits than irrigators. Under the concept of Shapley 
value, both irrigators and city users have a moderate growth in their net benefits. Overall, every stakeholder 
can expect an increase in net benefits when the demand management plan is carried out. The results also 




Fig. 3 (a) Total net benefits from initial water allocation and optimal reallocation for the grand coalition under different levels of 
reduction when initial water allocation is obtained from the PMMNF approach, and (b) total net benefits from initial water 
allocation and optimal reallocation for the grand coalition under different levels of reduction when initial water allocation is 
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Fig. 4 Comparison between total net benefits gained from the modified cooperative game for stakeholders with different levels of 












































































































































































































































































































































As indicated above, the reduction of water use is the consequence of water use efficiency improvement. 
Meanwhile, the net benefits function of each user may change along with water use efficiency improvement, 
and its net benefits from the utilization of water may change accordingly. In this section, the impact of net 
benefits functions with water use efficiency improvement on the total net benefits of each user will be further 
investigated.  
A parameter ρ is used to denote the level of water use efficiency improvement. The relation between water 
use efficiency improvement and level of water reduction is assumed to be linear for the sake of computation 
load and also because it is beyond the scope of this paper. Then, it can be incorporated into the net benefits 
function of each user. For agricultural users, its modified net benefits function with efficiency improvement 
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 (10) 
An example of the comparison of net benefits functions under different scenarios of efficiency improvement 
is depicted in Fig. 5(a). The figure shows the net benefits function with water use efficiency improvement for 
user A2 in May. It can be seen from the figure that more net benefits can be obtained with the same amount 
of water, and less water is needed to produce a certain amount of net benefits. 
Similarly, when the parameter ρ is taken into consideration for MI users, the modified water price-demand 
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    As an example, Fig. 5(b) shows a plotting of the comparison of water price-demand functions under 
different scenarios of efficiency improvement for user I2 in May. Accordingly, the modified net benefits 
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When the net benefits functions with efficiency improvement are applied to the model, new allocation 
schemes and net benefits results can be obtained. The total net benefits will witness a further increase 
compared to the results with original net benefits functions, as shown in Fig. 6. In terms of the total net benefits 
for each stakeholder after cooperative reallocation, its pattern is quite similar to the results shown in Fig. 4. 





Fig. 5 (a) A comparison of net benefits functions under different scenarios of efficiency promotion for user A2 in May, and (b) a 
comparison of water price-demand functions under differenct scenarios of efficiency promotion for user I2 in May 
 
 
Fig. 6 Total net benefits from allocation under different scenarios in which different levels of reduction and efficiency promotion 
are considered and initial allocation is obtained from the PMMNF method 
6 Conclusions 
A water demand management plan is specified and incorporated into the Cooperative Water Allocation 
Model (CWAM) to investigate its impact on water users. The results demonstrate several advantages of a water 
demand management plan. Firstly, more aggregated net benefits for the grand coalition can be yielded through 
water transfer from less productive users to more productive users and cooperation among water users. 
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allocate the additional net benefits, which provides motivation for water users to carry out a demand 
management plan. Finally, water demand management can play an important role in alleviating water stress 
facing humanity in the near future, and prevent more water conflicts from happening. It can thus be of great 
assistance in some arid and semi-arid regions, especially areas with low water productivity. 
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